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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AN)
PROCEDURE.
C. G. VERNIER AND E. A. WiLcox.
ILLEGAL SEIZURE OR SEARCH.
Calhoun v. State, Ga., 87 S. E. 893; Smith v. State, Ga. App, 87 S. E. 713.
Admissibility of evidence thus obtained.
Calhoun v. State involves an interesting point on the admission of evi-
dence. The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in this case that articles taken
from the person of the accused by one who has illegally arrested him are
admissible in evidence against him, and that this does not violate the constitu-
tional provision that "no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be
a witness against himself." The decision is based on the Court's finding that,
in admitting evidence so obtained, the accused is not compelled to do any act
incriminating himself. The criterion as laid down by the Court is, "Who fur-
nished the evidentiary facts connecting defendant with the crime?"
Smith v. State holds the admission of evidence obtained by an illegal
search of premises of the accused is not error and not a violation of the Fourth
Amefidment which guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures.
There is apparently considerable conflict in state decisions on the points
involved in the two cases above cited, but a careful examination and comparison
of the cases show that the rule as laid down above is quite generally followed.
While this is looked on as the general rule, it should be noted that some
courts go to the extent of saying "the court wil not take notice of whom the
evidence was obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue
to determine that question." Other courts limit the rule so as to bar admission
of evidence obtained by search under a warrant that was not lawfully issued for
some purpose. So, in State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa, 164, evidence is held to have
been improperly admitted because it was f9und by use of a search warrant
which had no legal purpose whatever, but was issued solely to obtain testimony
against the accused.
Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, was looked on as a leading case for a number
of years. It holds that "search and seizure of a man's private papers (invoices,
etc.) to be used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of a crime, or
requiring a penalty or forfeiture of his property, is totally different from search
and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles on' which duties have not been
paid, and the like, which rightfully belong to custody of the law." In accord-
ance with this distinction the case holds that private papers unlawfully taken
from a man's possession are-not proper evidence against him, and to admit
them would violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
A later U. S. case, Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, attempts to distinguish
rather than overrule Boyd v. U. S., but itself stands for the proposition that
"private papers of defendant found in search made under a legal warrant for
the search of gaming paraphernalia, are properly admissible in evidence against
the owner who is on trial."
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Some state courts have recognized the distinction made in Boyd v. U. S.
between private papers and articles, but the majority seem to be in accord with
Adam v. IV. Y. in making no distinction.
In summing up the authorities on the point, it may be said that, if the
person or belongings of the accused are searched by another, although without
vestige of authority, the evidence thus discovered may be used against him
"(Gundrat v. People, 138 Ill. 103, and State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290) ; and if
a warrant is legally issued for some purpose, evidence found incidentally is
admissible (Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585); if. a warrant was illegally
issued for the sole purpose of securing evidence against the accused it's admis-
sibility would be questioned in some courts (State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa, 164),
but admitted without question in others.
In connection with this point it is interesting to note that, if articles intro-
duced in evidence in a criminal prosecution were taken by officers offering
them without authority, they may be forced to respond in damages. Starch-
man v. State, 62 Ark. 538; Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511. Commonwealth v.
Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519. It is also generally held that evidence discovered by
aid of an inadmissible confession is admissible.-F. T. McGill, Iowa City, Ia.
SUSPENDED SENTENCE.
State v. Sharp, La., 70 So. 573. No appeal. In this case the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that a defendant convicted of violating a police jury
ordinance, upon whom sentence was suspended, was not entitled to an appeal,
on the ground that there had been no final judgment, and, therefore, no appeal
would lie. However, in this particular case, there was a statute (Act No. 74
of 1914) relative to the suspension of sentence, which expressly provided that,
if sentence is suspended, neither the verdict of conviction nor the judgment
entered thereon shall become final, except upon the conviction of the defendant
of another felony or misdemeanor.
Whether or not the holding of the court in the absence of this act would
have been the same, depends upon the question whether or not the suspension
of sentence is to be considered a final judgment. It is clear that if it is not so
considered, an appeal therefrom will be dismissed on the ground of being prema-
ture. State v. Fleming, 13 Iowa, 443; Hill v. The State, 41 Texas, 253; State
v. Sheshane, 25 Mo. 565. The principal difficulty is that the terms "Suspended
Sentence" and "Suspension of Sentence" are easily confused, and one must look
at the facts of the particular case to ascertain whether or not the defendant
in question had his sentence suspended or received a suspended sentence. The
term "suspended sentence," as used in criminal law, refers to the suspension
of the execution of a sentence already imposed and not correctly to the sus-
pending of the sentence. State v. Osborne, 79 N. J. Eq., 430, 82 Atl. 424, 428.
In the course of his opinion in this case, last cited, Garrison, V. C., goes deeply
into the discussion of the difference existing and difficulty arising in the use
of these terms, and also makes a thorough examination of the power of the
courts in the matter of suspending sentence. An excerpt of his opinion follows:
"The term 'suspending sentence' has been indiscriminately applied by many.
courts in tvo entirely different situations. In one use, it has been applied to
cases where the court did not impose any sentence whatever, but suspended the
pronouncing of the sentence; and it has been also applied to cases where a
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sentence has been pronounced, but the court has suspended the operation or
execution of sentence."
The opinion also contains a very good collection of cases which uphold or
deny the power of the court to suspend the pronouncing of the sentence, or the
suspension of the operation of the sentence in the various jurisdictions, in the
absence of legislation. Although there is not much in the books about this, the
English reports show that the courts of criminal jurisdiction exercised the power
of delaying the imposition of a sentence for various reasons and of delaying
the operation of an imposed sentence and did not do this by virtue of any
statute, and, therefore, must have inherently had the power so to do. State v.
Osborne, 79 N. J. Eq. 430. Whether or not this power will be exercised in
the courts of this country depends upon the rule in the particular jurisdiction.
After this has been discovered it is also necessary to determine what the court
has actually done-that is, suspended imposing the sentence or given the sen-
tence but suspended its execution. In those jurisdictions where the former
rule is law, and the trial court has as yet not pronounced the'sentence, the
courts would probably hold that an appeal therefrom without any showing of
objection to such suspension would be premature. Certain it is that there has
been no final judgment in such case.
However, if the defendant after convietion does not wish to have the pro-
nouncing of his sentence suspended, he may object, and this would undoubtedly
result in the trial court not attempting to exercise its jurisdiction, since, as an
original proposition, such a suspension is nothing but beneficial to the defendant,
and should he object to receiving this benefit, the court would no doubt fail to
accommodate him by yielding to his objection, thereby also relieving him of
the benefit he would otherwise have enjoyed. The only possible objection he
could have, would be the undesirability of remaining in the indeterminate posi-
tion resultingfrom a suspension of the pronouncement of judgment; but this,
too, is within his control, since the convicted defendant, if the facts were such
as to make it an unreasonable suspension, could compel the proper court, by
mandamus, to pronounce judgment.
After such judgment was pronounced it would undoubtedly be final in the
sense that an appeal founded thereon would not be premature, even though the
rule in that jurisdiction happened to be that the court had power to suspend the
execution of the sentence after it had been given. This, however, is the minority
rule. Miller v. Evans, 88 N. W. 198. In the majority of the' jurisdictions the
rule is that after sentence has once been pronounced there can be no suspension
of its execution, and it is clear that in such cases the judgment is final and may
be appealed from.
It will be seen then that, although the rules in the various jurisdictions differ,
the matter of appeal is almost wholly within the determination of the de-
fendant. True, it may be more difficult for one convicted to get an appeal
where the pronouncement of his- sentence has been suspended (granting the
court in that particular jurisdiction has power to do so), since he must take
other steps to have the final judgment or sentence rendered if the court refuses
to impose it when he objects to its suspension. Still there is a resulting benefit
to the defendant in the vast majority of cases which is so great that the in-
stances are very few when such a step would be taken. After all, it is simply
a matter of taking any of the necessary steps to make the court impose the
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sentence which has been suspended, and then, after having a final judgment,
carrying on the appeal when it will not be vulnerable to the objection that it is
prenrature.-H. J. Ries, Iowa City, Ia.
PRIVATE COUNSEL RETAINED TO ASSIST IN PROSECUTION.
Rock v. Eckern,' Wis., 156 N. W. 197. Contrary to public policy. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in this case reiterates what seems to be a rule
common only to its own and Michigan jurisdictions; viz., that a contract with
the complaining witness in a prosecution, whereby an attorney agreed to assist
the district attorney, is void as against public policy, and no recovery can be
had, although the accused, the court, and the district attorney acquiesced in
the prosecution according to the contract.
All contracts which are repugnant to justice or founded on an immoral
consideration, or against the policy of common law, or contrary to statute, are
void. Melchoir.v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 252.
Under the English practice, at the time of the Revolution, prosecution by
private parties was the rule rather than the -exception, there being no public
prosecutor who had general charge of criminal business. Under our modern
statutes providing for public prosecutors the practice has quite generally con-
tinued, and only in a few cases has it been questioned.
In Rounds et al. v. State, 57 Wis. 45, the court overruled an objection by
defendant to counsel assisting the district attorney, the latter being present
and nct objecting. Earlier and later decisions in Wisconsin and Michigan are
contra. People v. Hurst, 1 N. W. 1027; Austin v. Supervisors of Milwaukee
County, 24 Wis. 278; Buckley v. Schwartz, 83 Wis. 304; Smeed v. People, 38
Mich. 248. These cases lay down the doctrine that the duty of prosecuting is on
the public prosecutor, that he is a public officer and that to allow assistants
privately hired would be in effect to allow him compensation outside of that
fixed by law; that his duty is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the
guilty, and that an assistant privately hired would sacrifice justice to the pride
of professional success.
Many cases say there is no ground for'objection to privately hired or ap-
pointed assistants to the prosecutor. State v. Bartlett, 55 Maine, 200; Kansas
v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189; Griffin v. State, 15 Ga. 476; Burckhard v. State, 18 Texas
Appeal, 599; Wood v. State, 92 Ind. 269; Commonw'ealth v. King, 8 Gray, 501.
If the appearance of privately hired assistants is against public policy, it
must be because the prosecuting attorney, and not the court, -has the power to
insure justice, and it would seem the one directly affected should be entitled
to the rule in favor of the general public. If repugnant to the idea of a prose-
cution by the one officially elected and qualified under the statute, an appoint-
ment of an assistant by the court does not.overcome this objection; it would
seem since the court can appoint and since the appointee would not be an officer,
and since he is entitled to compensation even where the statute is silent, that
the legislative intent was not to change the previous practice, but to insure
action; if there is virtue in the power of appointment, acquiescence should,
amount to such an exercise of that power.
The extension of the public policy doctrine should be carefully guarded.
The power to contract should be left unrestrained as far as possible; the public
injury should be free from doubt.
The Wisconsin and Michigan doctrine ignores the technicalities built about
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a criminal prosecution that in themselves are intended to absolutely assure jus-
tice-the rules of procedure are not varied by the fact that an assistant appears
in the prosecution.
Michigan and Wisconsin both recognize the validity of a reward contract
for arrest and conviction; most' jurisdictions have questioned the policy of
these, at one time or another, on the ground that they tend to perjury. Public
policy does forbid that anything should be accomplished by means of an offer
of reward which cannot be accomplished by means of a-contract.
The doctrine of the Michigan and Wisconsin cases is not supported by the,
early cases cited by the court. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 4 Gray 146; Common-
wealth v. King, 8 Gray, 501; Hite v. State, 9 Yerg. 193; Jarnagin v..State, 10
Yerg, 529-A. H. Bolton, Iowa City, Iowa.
APPEAL.
People v. Bertlini, 157 N. Y. Supp. 599. Technical error., On appeal from
a conviction of robbery, the issue for the court is, 'hot whether the defendant
is guilty, but whether he was adjudged guilty after trial in substantial con-
formity to law.
Admission of improper evidence as to identification of defendent, held such
error as to require reversal, in spite of Code Crim. Proc., Sec. 542, providing
that on appeal the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors,
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
The decision of the court on appeal from a conviction cannot be affected
by the fact that it would, even without improper proof excluded, reach the
conclusion reached by the jury.
BURGLARY.
People v. Toland, N. Y., 111 N. E. 760. Meaning of "break." Penal law,
Sec. 404, sub. 2, provides that a person who, being in a building, commits a
crime therein and breaks out of the building, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree. Defendant and others entered a barn through an open doorway, closed
and fastened the door with a hook or strap sufficiently to prevent egress unless
the fastening were removed, and, after killing a heifer therein, stole the meat,
unfastened the door and left the barn. Held, that this was such a breaking out
as was within the statute, as the door was an obstacle to egress as though
closely shut and firmly latched, and the word "break" in the statute is used in
the sense of the removal of impediments to passage, and it was immaterial that
the door was closed by defendant and his companions, and that in opening it
they were restoring it to the condition in which they found it.
CAmIRS.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Messina, 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 368. Riding free with
employee's consent. Riding upon the tender of an interstate train by permis-
sion of the engineer without payment of fare is made unlawful by the act of
Feb. 4, 1887, Sec. 1, as amended by act June 29, 1906, under which any common
carrier violating the provisions of that statute against free transportation is
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a penalty, and any other person other
than those excepted, who uses such interstate free trasportation, is made subject
to a like penalty. Hughes, J., dissenting.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Tanner, Atty. Gen. of the State of Washington, v. Little, 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr.
379. Sales with trading stamps or coupons. Equal protection of the 'laws.
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Impairing contract abligations. The imposition under Wash. Laws 1913, Chap.
134, of an annual license tax of $6,000 upon merchants using stamps, tickets,
or coupons redeemable in cash or merchandise, is not repugnant to the equal
protection of the laws clause of the U. S. Const., 14th Amend., as an attempted
arbitrary classification, whether such stamps-are prepared or redeemed by the
merchant issuing them or by a third party with whom the merchant has a con-
tract for their use. Nor does it impair the contract obligations of such mer-
chants with their customers or with third parties with whom they have con-
tracted for the use of such stamps or coupons.
Butler v. Perry, Sheriff of Columbia County, Florida, 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr.
258. Inloluntary servitude. Conscripted labor on highway. Involuntary serv-
itude is not imposed, contrary to U. S. Cont., 13th Amend., by the provision of
the Florida Laws 1913, Chap. 6537, Secs. 10, 12, making it a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment for any able-bodied male person between the
ages of twenty-one and forty-five years to fail in any year to perform six days
labor on the highways of his county, when summoned, or to provide an able-
bodied substitute, or, in lieu thereof, pay $3 to the road overseer.
EXTRADITION.
Innes v. Tobin, Sheriff of Bexar County, Texas, 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 290.
Exclusiveness of Federal power. The governor of Oregon honored a requisi-
.tion made by the governor of Texas for the delivery of the plaintiff in error
for removal to Texas as a fugitive from justice of that state. The accused was
taken to Texas, tried for murder and acquitted. She was not released from
custody, however, because ordered held by the governor of Texas under a
requisition of the governor of Georgia.
Held, the failure of Congress when enacting the interstate extradition pro-
visions of U. S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 5278, Comp. Stat. 1913, Sec. 10126, to provide
for the case of a fugitive from justice vho has not fled into the state where he
is found, but was brought into it involuntarily by a requisition from another
state, does not take the matters within the unprovided area out of possible state
action, but leaves the state free to deliver the accused to any state from whose
justice he has fled.
GRAND JURY.
Wilson v. U. S., 229 Fed. 344. Presence 'of stenographer in grand jry
room. The presence in the grand jury room of a stenographer, who merely
recorded the testimony as it was given and did not attend at the deliberations
of the grand jury, did not invalidate an indictment, especially where such sten-
ographer was a regular clerk and assistant'to the district attorney, appointed
by the attorney general to an office with prescribed duties and fixed tenure, and
who had taken the oath required from all government officials. "Apparently
there have been different answers to this question in different districts; but in
this circuit (the second) for 'upwards of sixty years it has been uniformly
held that the presence of a proper shorthand reporter, who merely recorded
the testimony as it was given and did not attend at the deliberations of the
grand jury did not invalidate an indictment."
NARcoTIc DRUGS.
U. S. v. Curtis, 229 Fed. 288. Extent of protection to sales tnder prescrip-
tion under Harrison Narcotic Law. Harrison Narcotic Law (Act Dec. 17, 1914.
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c. 1) provides, relative to opium or cocoa leaves, or any compound or prepara-
tion thereof, that it shall be unlawful to sell any of the drugs, except in pur-
suance of a written order of the person to whom the article is sold, but nothing
therein contained shall apply to the distribution of any of such drugs to a patient
by a physician registered thereunder in the course of -his practice, 1irovided
that such physician shall keep a record of all such drugs dispensed, nor to the
sale of any of such drugs by a dealer to a consumer under a written prescrip-
tion issued by a physician registered thereunder. Held, that a physician who
issues a prescription for an unusually large amount of the drugs, which prescrip-
tion shows on its face that the quantity prescribed is uffusual and unreason-
able, is guilty of an offense, unless the prescription indicates the necessity for
such an unusual quantity.
SELF-INcRIMINATION.
U. S. v. Lombardo, 228 Fed. 980. Constitutionality of Sec. 6, White Slave
Traffic Act. White Slave Traffic Act, Sec. 6 (Comp. Stat. 1913, Sec. 8817),
requires that every person keeping an alien woman or girl in any house or
place for purposes of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, to file
with the Commissioner General of Immigration a statement in writing setting
forth certain facts, and provides that any such person failing to file such state-
ment shall be guilty of a misdeameanor; that no person shall be excused from
furnishing the statement on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him,
but that no person shall be prosecuted "under any law of the United States" on
account of anything truthfully reported in such statement. Rem. & Bal. Code
Wash., Secs. 2440, 2688, make it an offense to keep a house of prostitution, or
to place a female therein with intent that she shall live a life of prostitution,
Held, that Sec. 6 violates Const. U. S., Amend. 5, providing that a party
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, as
a party harboring an alien for the purposes of prostitution is thereby required
to furnish evidence which could be used against him in a prosecution for
violation of the state laws.
